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BOOK REVIEWS
Book Reviews
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, by Jerome Frank. New York: Brentano's,
1930. Pp. 362. Price, $4.00.
Mr. Frank's valuable thesis is that law in action is not and cannot be
the mechanical application of rules and principles. He sees clearly that
the traditional syllogistic logic of legal literature provides phrases for the
statement of conclusions, but plays an infinitely small part in the living
process of deciding cases. He senses that the flux of the world in which
men live and the individuality of situations which give rise to lawsuits
make absolute predictability of law undesirable and impossible. All this
is not novel, nor would Mr. Frank claim novelty for it.* But lack of
novelty of this thesis is no criticism of Mr. Frank's book, for there is
always room for an additional countercheck on the tendency of the legal
mind to wander from its vital problems to logomachies. Further, Mr.
Frank's keenness has enabled him to lay bare unswept corners that others
have not penetrated; he has reduced to a negligible minimum the sphere
in which mechanical jurisprudence can and should have any operation.
The inveterate tendency to disregard this thesis; the constant unwill-
ingness of intelligent men to admit that law is not and cannot be the auto-
matic application of a predetermined scheme, seems to Mr. Frank to de-
mand an explanation. He offers this theory: Human beings have been
children; children have been embryos. The life of an embryo is a very
happy one. Other folks lead lives of vicissitudes, but they have a subcon-
scious memory of their lives as embryos, coupled with a nostalgia for this
perfect life left at birth. The parents, particularly the father, make a
child's life comparatively secure; and the child, finding its wish for se-
curity satisfied by the father, harbors the illusion that the father is om-
niscient and omnipotent. When this illusion is dissipated he transfers his
feelings from the father to the law-which he subconsciously considers
capable of satisfying his longing for that comfortable world of which the
midwife robbed him. This theory is Mr. Frank's theme song, inter-
larded at frequent intervals with his attack on mechanical jurisprudence.
The final strain is ever this moral: Those who deal with law must grow
up, be emotionally adult, be willing to face the facts of life which include
adventures of uncertainty and insecurity, even in law courts.
The reviewer doubts the adequacy of this interesting psycho-analytical
theory as the sole or most important element in the recurring failure
of the legal mind to be "realistic."
Justice Holmes (Mr. Frank's perfectly adult legal scholar) has said
that "general propositions do not decide concrete cases." It is also true
that concrete cases do not decide themselves, but must be decided by men,
preferably men who are addicted to the habit of thinking. And thought
is always-to some extent-general (abstract). All will agree that each
litigation has individuality, but at the same time all thinking (good or
* See, for instance, Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. Q.
17, or Oliphant and Hewitt's introduction to the translation of RUEFF,
FROM THE PHYSICAL TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.
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bad) is a process in which uniqueness and resemblances (assumed, in-
vented, or discovered) are balanced. A completely unique experience can
have no meaning, an entirely novel idea is a patent impossibility.
So the proposition that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen is
no more completely concrete than the proposition that contracts' include a
meeting of the minds; and the inventor of the former was probably no more
adult than the inventor of the latter. The outstanding difference seems
to be this: The chemists have hit upon a scheme of abstraction productive of
generalizations more or less satisfactory in numerous "chemical situa-
tions," while juridical propositions seem to be of little use in "legal situa-
tions." The legal thinkers have been no less diligent, sincere, or compe-
tent than the chemists, and luck alone does not seem adequate to account
for the success of the latter and the groping of the former. Nor can it
be answered that the chemists' realm of study is objective and detached,
while the jurist must study a social structure of which he is a part and
which will, therefore, not lend itself to unemotional, detached study.
Certainly the chemists study the same water which has emotional con-
notations for all men, including chemists; and certainly no chemist can
claim more calm detachment than a Williston.
Dean Pound's conception of the "Period of Strict Law" has at least
this much truth in it: There have been times when some legal proposi-
tions have been applied to reach decisions with almost ruthless certainty.
For example, the common law proposition that a man was bound by an
instrument sealed with his seal. At one time this rule admitted of no
exception; it contained an adequate description of the decisions that had
been reached and was an adequate prophecy of decisions that would be
reached. The proposition "'worked" as a proposition as nicely as any
which mankind has ever been able to put. But cases arose in which the
working of the rule produced results which were called in question; the
decisions regarded as means rather than ends were unsatisfactory.
When legal decisions are regarded as means, any scheme of ends inust
implicate the lives of men as lived, the most complex subject for thought
that has ever been chosen. Thought about "society," what it is, what it
wants, where it is going, has always been too big a subject for human
brains. But man, "the thinking animal," seems to be so constituted that
he perceives (invents) social problems and attempts to solve them. And
thought is selective (abstract); the thinker must necessarily develop or
use schemes of thought; without an acquired or developed capital of ab-
stract ideas the thinker is bankrupt. So philosophers, economists, soci-
ologists, and politicians, as well as lawyers, are always building or using
schemes of thought which crystallize into propositions, principles, laws,
and rules. These schemes become entrenched in the ways of minds and
die hard, even though their application in "concrete situations" is often
undesirable and impossible.
Would Mr. Frank suggest that all thinking about "society" is ridden
with a father fixation? It is guessed that he wouldn't; and that much which
Mr. Frank labels as a suppressed desire for the security of the womb is
more easily accounted for as a groping for the materials of a thoughtful
jurisprudence, as distinguished from a decision of cases on intuition.
CLARENCE MOaniS.
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol16/iss2/20
